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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Corrections to State's Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On page 1 of its Brief, the State wrote that I.C. " ... agreed to go with Sileoni to the back
room for sex in hopes of finding an opportunity to escape ... " citing pages 2, 17, and 23 of the
PSI. However, none of the information on these pages support this statement. Rather all three
pages are duplicates of one another and all three state that I.C "stated she 'pretended to agree to
go to the back' so she could flee." None state that I.C. claimed that she agreed or pretended to
agree to go to the back to have sex.
As the key question in this case, whether the district court had a sua sponte duty to
inquire into the factual basis for the plea, turns on whether Mr. Sileoni had the intent to commit
rape, this summary of the information available to the district court is significant.
Counter to the state's erroneous reference to an agreement to go to the back to have sex,
at PSI p. 4, Maximiliano stated, " ... I know that I tuch her without her will but I never were
really to rape her I sexualy tuch her and thas it I wasnt going to go more farder then that." And,
in her statement to the police, I.C. did not say that she agreed to go into the back for sex, but
rather "[I.C.] said she pretended to go along with the suspect by stating they should go in back."
PSI p. 32, Addendum, Caldwell Police Department P.C. Affidavit/Case Synopsis. Further, the
P.C. Affidavit/Case Synopsis reports that Maximiliano denied any intention of having sex with
I.C. PSI p. 34, Addendum, Caldwell Police Depa11ment P.C. Affidavit/Case Synopsis. And, in
her statement to the officer who first arrived on the scene, I.C. stated that Maximiliano asked her
if she wanted to go to the back, but did not state that he asked her if she wanted to go to the back
to have sex. She also reported that Maximiliano never lowered his own pants. PSI p. 38,
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Addendum, Caldwell Police Department, Report Supplement. Additionally, during the police
interview at the time of arrest, Maximiliano denied any intent to have sex with J.C. "Sileoni
denied he had intended to have sex with [J.C.] and denied he ever had an erection (with my usage
of the word boner being the word he responded to for understanding the word erection)." PSI p.
44, Addendum, Caldwell Police Department Report Supplement.
The state is incorrect when it says that I. C. agreed to go into the back of the store for sex.
Rather, the information before the district court was as set out in Maximiliano's Opening Brief.
B. The State Has Misunderstood Maximiliano' s Argument on Appeal

The state's Brief responds to "Sileoni's claim that his plea was not valid because he did
not admit to the police his intent to rape." Respondent's Brief at page 4. However, this is not
the issue presented on appeal. 1
Maximiliano has presented the issue of whether remand is necessary to allow the district
court to fulfill its sua sponte obligation to conduct an inquiry into the factual basis for
Maximiliano' s guilty plea and if the district court finds that the factual basis is lacking, allow
Maximiliano to withdraw the plea. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 9-13.
Maximiliano is not asking this Court to declare his plea invalid. Rather, he is asking that
the case be remanded for the appropriate inquiry. Only if the district court finds that a factual
basis for the plea is lacking, would Maximiliano then be allowed to withdraw his plea. Id.

1

The issues presented on appeal are set out at page 9 of Appellant's Opening Brief in
accord with IAR 35(a)(4). The state has "rephrased" the issues presented at page 3 of its Brief.
However, the appellate rules do not provide authority for a respondent to "rephrase" the issues on
appeal. Rather, JAR 35(b )( 4) authorizes the respondent to "list additional issues presented on
appeal." Rephrasing of the issues may have led to the state responding to an issue which was
never raised on appeal.
2

Maximiliano asks that this Court not allow the state's misunderstanding of the issue raised on
appeal to result in a rejection of the actual issue raised on appeal. Whether the issue the state
mistakenly believes was raised on appeal should be found meritorious or not is irrelevant to
whether the actual issue raised on appeal merits relief.
C. Remand is Necessary for an Inquiry Into the Factual Basis of the Pleas
The state has argued, citing State v. Wyatt. 131 Idaho 95, 98, 952 P.2d 910, 913 (Ct App.
1998)2 and Simons v. State, 116 Idaho 69, 773 P.2d 1156 (Ct. App. 1989), that because
Maximiliano entered guilty pleas, the district court had no duty to ascertain a factual basis frn· the
pleas. Respondent's Brief at

5-6. In making this argument, the state does not address the

controlling precedent precedent which holds that there was a duty to inquire into the factual
basis for the pleas. The state neither argues that this precedent is no longer valid nor that it
should be overruled. Rather, it does not mention the precedent.
The precedent is as follows:
In 1982, in Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (Ct App. 1982), the Court of
Appeals set out the general rule that a trial court has no duty to inquire as to the factual basis for
a plea except in certain circumstances, including when the defendant does not recall the facts of
the incident which resulted in the offense charged, or is unwilling or unable to admit
participation in the acts constituting the crime, or couples the plea with continued assertions of
innocence. In explaining the exceptions to the general rule the Comi wrote:
Of course, this holding does not diminish a court's obligation to conduct such an
inquiry if - after a plea is entered but before sentence is imposed - the court

2

The state cites Wyatt as a Supreme Court case. Respondenf s Brief at pages iii and 5. It
is, however, a Court of Appeals case.
3

receives information raising an obvious doubt as to whether the defendant is in
fact guilty. In such circumstances, the trial court should inquire into the factual
basis of the plea, either to dispel the doubt or to allow the defendant to plead
anew.
103 Idaho at 345, 647 P.2d at 801.
A year later, in State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 550, 661 P.2d 328,335, ftnt. 3 (1983), the
Idaho Supreme Court quoted with approval the above language from Schmidt, upholding the plea
in a case where the district court registered its concern about the lack of a factual basis for a
guilty plea and gave the defendant "ample opportunity" to withdraw the plea, but the defendant,
after discussion with counsel, determined that he wished to plead guilty anyway to the charged
cnmes.
Two years later, in State v. Hoffman, 108 Idaho 720, 701 P.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1985), the
Court of Appeals again affirmed the duty to inquire into a factual basis for a plea in certain cases.
"However, such an inquiry [into the factual basis] should be made if a plea of guilty is coupled
with an assertion of innocence or if the court receives infonnation before sentencing raising an
obvious doubt as to guilt." 108 Idaho at 722, 701 P.2d at 670.
That same year, the Court of Appeals decided Fowler v. State, 109 Idaho 1002, 712 P.2d
703 (Ct. App. 1985). The issue in that case was whether Fowler's statements in the PSI were
sufficient to raise an obvious doubt as to his guilt so as to trigger the duty to ascertain a factual
basis for the plea. The Fowler court quoted the language of Schmidt requiring an inquiry into the
factual basis if the court receives information raising an obvious doubt as to whether the
defendant is in fact guilty and then held that Fowler's statements were not sufficient to raise an
obvious doubt as to his guilt. Again the Court affirmed the existence of the sua sponte duty.
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after Fowler. in Amerson v. State, 1 I 9 ldaho 994, 996, 812 P.2d 301,303 (Ct.
App. 1991 ), the Court of Appeals wrote, "However, such an inquiry [into the factual basis for the
plea] should be made if an Alford3 plea is accepted, or if the court receives information before
sentencing which raises an obvious doubt as to guilt." Id, citing State v. Hoffman, supra.
Then just a year later, the Court of Appeals again affirmed that an inquiry into the factual
basis for a plea is required if the court receives information before sentencing which raises an
obvious doubt as to guilt in State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 834, 839 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Ct. App.
1992), quoting Amerson, supra.
And, again, the duty was affirmed in State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860,876 P.2d 142 (Ct.
App. 1994). As in Fowler, the question before the Court of Appeals was whether the
information received by the district court prior to sentencing was sufficient to

an obvious

doubt as to guilt so as to trigger the sua sponte duty. Again, as in Fowler, the Court of Appeals
found that the information before the court did not raise an obvious doubt as to guilt, but did not
alter the duty to inquire in the appropriate case.
None of these cases have been overruled. The precedent remains that if the district comi
receives infonnation raising an obvious doubt as to guilt prior to sentencing, an inquiry must be
made into the factual basis for the plea and if such basis is lacking, an opportunity must be given
to withdraw the plea.
Rather than acknowledging this authority, the state cites this Court to State v. Wyatt,

supra. for the "well-settled" principle that a district court need not elicit a actual basis for a plea
entered without reservation. Wyatt presented a different issue for review by the Court of Appeals

3

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970).

5

than the issue presented in this case. In Wyatt, a defendant who had pied guilty in a hearing
wherein the district court elicited a factual basis for the guilty plea, asked the Court of Appeals to
find that the district comi had later erred in not granting his motion to withdraw his plea. In
finding that the district court did not err, the Court of Appeals stated that the law is well-settled
that a court need not elicit a factual basis before accepting a plea - and did not set out any of the
exceptions to this rule - including the exceptions for situations in which the defendant does not
recall the facts of the incident which resulted in the charge, the defendant is unwilling or unable
to admit participation in the acts constituting the crime, the defendant couples the plea with
continued assertions of innocence, or the court receives information raising an obvious doubt as
to guilt. From this omission, the state argues that the district court does not have any duty to
inquire into the factual basis of a plea in this case.
But, this omission of a list of the exceptions to the general rule did not amount to an
overruling of the precedent imposing the exceptions. See Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 226
P.3d 1269 (2010) and Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 247 P.3d 210 (Ct. App. 2010), decided
after Wyatt affirming the duty to inquire into the factual basis to support an Alford plea.
The failure to mention the exception to the general rule not requiring inquiry into the
factual basis for a plea in a case wherein the trial court receives information raising an obvious
doubt about guilt prior to sentencing in a case wherein that exception could not possibly apply
anyway (as the court did not receive any information raising an obvious doubt as to guilt and did
make an inquiry into the factual basis of the plea), does not overrule the prior precedent
establishing the exception nor does it negate the exception. The state's reliance on Wyatt is
misplaced.

6

The state also relies on Simons v. State, supra, which it argues rejected an argument
indistinguishable from Maximiliano's. Respondent's Brief at pages 5-6. However, Simons is
clearly distinguishable from Maximiliano's case. Simons pled guilty to involuntary
manslaughter based upon the death of Jameson. Simons and Jameson had been in an altercation
and Simons, who was drunk, got into a car, locked the door and drove away. Jameson's hand
was caught in the door of the car and Simons dragged him for seven or eight miles resulting in
his death. When she was finally stopped by the police, she claimed that she did not know
Jameson was attached to the car. 116 Idaho at 71, 773 P .2d at 115 8.
Simons entered a guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter. 115 Idaho at 75-76, 773 P.2d
at 1162-63. At the sentencing hearing, Simons made a denial of guilt that the judge found
incredible. The Court of Appeals held, "This is not the kind of disavowal of guilt that triggers an
obligation to ascertain a factual basis for the plea." The Court of Appeals further noted that even
though the judge was not required to make an inquiry into the factual basis, the judge did do so
and found that Simons intended to harm Jameson. The Court held that this finding was
supported by the record and sufficient to satisfy any requirement to ascertain the factual basis of
the plea. 115 Idaho at 76, 773 P .2d at 1163.
Rather than being indistinguishable from Maximiliano's case, Simons was a case where
the Court held that an unbelievable denial of guilt at sentencing is not sufficient to trigger the
recognized duty to make a sua sponte inquiry into the factual basis for a plea. In Maximiliano's
case, rather than an unbelievable denial of guilt, the court was provided with information that
there was not evidence to support a finding of the intent element of the charged offense.
Specifically, Maximiliano had consistently stated that he did not intend to have sex, he did not
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lower his pants, he did not have an erection, and l.C. did not make any claim that in agreeing to
go into the back room there was ever any discussion of an intent to have sex, much less nonconsensual sex.
Also, in Simons, the district court found that there was a factual basis for the plea. In
Maximiliano 's case the district court did not make such a finding.
The law is that if the district com1 receives information which raises an obvious doubt of
guilt, it must make a factual inquiry into the basis of the plea. Here, the court received
infonnation raising an obvious doubt as to whether Maximiliano intended to engage in penile
penetration, a necessary element of rape per LC. § 18-6101, and without that intent, he could not
be guilty of battery with intent to commit rape per LC.§ 18-907. Thus, there was a duty to
inquire into the factual basis for the plea and this Court should remand this case with instructions
to complete the required inquiry and if a factual basis is not found, to allow withdrawal of the
pleas. 4 Coffin, supra, Horkley, supra.
D. The Record Does Not Demonstrate "A More Than Sufficient" Factual Basis
for the Guilty Plea
The state also argues that even if an inquiry into the factual basis for the plea is required
in this case, the record demonstrates "an exceptionally strong" factual basis. Respondent's Brief
at pages 6-7.
Although the state claims the factual basis was exceptionally strong, it does not cite
anything in the record that establishes this factual basis. Rather, it argues that as LC. asserted

4

As set out in the Opening Brief at page 12, if there is no factual basis for the charge of
battery with intent to commit rape, the plea to the deadly weapon enhancement must also be
withdrawn.
8

that Maximiliano had "groped her breasts and genitals" and Maximiliano admitted as much, it
was obviously rational to plead guilty to battery with intent to commit rape with a deadly weapon
enhancement in exchange for dismissal of a kidnap charge. Id. But, whether the decision to
plead guilty was rational is, of course, a different question from the question of whether there
was a factual basis for the guilty plea.
And, of course, groping is not rape and groping is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
precondition for an intent to commit rape. LC.§ 18-6101 (defining rape as penetration with the
perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female under specified circumstances).
The job of inquiring into and ascertaining the factual basis lies with the district court. Id.
This Court should remand the case to allow the proper court to make the required inquiry
because this Court is a court of law and not a fact-finding court. However, should this Court be
inclined to accept the state's invitation, an invitation Maximiliano does not extend, to make a
factual finding regarding the existence of a factual basis for Maximiliano's pleas, this Court
should find, for the reasons discussed above, that the factual basis was lacking and reverse
Maximiliano' s conviction.
E. The Issue Raised on Appeal is Properly Presented
The state's final argument is that Maximiliano may not present a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea for the first time on appeal. Respondent's Brief at page 7-8. Again, the state has
misunderstood the nature of the relief Maximiliano is seeking in this appeal. He is not presenting
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea - which, of course, would be frivolous, as motions to
withdraw pleas are heard in the district court not the appellate court. He is requesting that this
Court review the failure of the district court to fulfill its sua sponte duty to inquire into the
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factual basis for the plea and remand with instructions to conduct the required inquiry.
Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 9-13.
The state cites three cases in support of its argument that Maximiliano may not present a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea for the first time on appeal: State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844,
828 P.2d 817,873 (1991); State v. Gomez, 127 Idaho 327,329,900 P.2d 803,805 (Ct. App.
1995); and State v. Sands, 121 Idaho 1023, 1025-26, 829 P.2d 1

1374-75 (Ct. App. 1992).

While the state is correct that in these three cases, the appellate court declined to consider for the
first time on appeal various issues relating to guilty pleas, none of the cases address the issue
raised in this case - whether remand is appropriate when the district court failed to satisfy a sua

sponte duty to make an inquiry into the factual basis for a guilty plea.
Further, all of these cases pre-date State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,

P.3d 961 (2010),

and provide no insight as to whether the fundamental error doctrine as defined by Perry is
intended to apply to issues concerning the sua sponte duties of trial courts. As discussed in
Maximiliano's Opening Brief, insulation of sua sponte duties from appellate review by
application of the fundamental error doctrine would render these duties as something other than

sua sponte. This would impose a duty on counsel to object and would be contrary to public
policy because it would increase the risk that trial courts would intentionally or unintentionally
allow people to be convicted of crimes in violation of the most basic requirements of due process
- requirements so basic that they are made sua sponte duties of the district courts. See State v.

Almaraz,

Idaho

P.3d

2012 WL 1948499 (2012), which holds that Perry's

reach is not limitless in precluding appellate review and allows the appellate court discretion to
consider issues taking into account the context of the proceedings in the district court.
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This Court should review the issue Maximiliano actually raised in appeal and remand the
case for exercise of the district court's fact-finding power to inquire into the factual basis for the
plea.
F. The Court Should Grant Relief From the Excessive Sentence
As discussed in the Opening Brief, if this case is remanded, it should be remanded with
instructions that if the conviction ultimately remains, the sentence must be reduced. And, in the
alternative, relief from the sentence should be granted in this Court because the sentence is
excessive. Appellant's Opening Brief, pages 13-18.
In its Brief, the state argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion and therefore
the sentence should remain. Respondent's Brief at pages 8-11. In making this argument, the
state urges this Court to not conduct an independent review of the record, but rather to apply the
standard that factual findings will not be set aside absent a showing that they are clearly
erroneous. Respondent's Brief at page 9.
The case the state cites for this standard of review is State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 686,
991 P.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 1999). In Thomas, the Court of Appeals addressed three issues
including whether the sentence imposed violated the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment and whether the sentence was excessive. The language quoted by the state
for a standard ofreview of an excessive sentence ("Factual findings will not be set aside on
appeal unless there is a showing that they are clearly erroneous." Id.) was actually the standard of
review applied to the question of whether the sentence was cruel and unusual. With regard to the
question of whether the sentence was excessive, the Thomas court applied the generally accepted
standard for excessive sentence review cases: "Where an appellant asserts that the sentencing

11

court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record
and focus upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." 133 Idaho at 687,
991 P.2d at 875.
As recently stated in State v. Justice, 152 Idaho 48, 54, 266 P .3d 1153, 1159 (Ct. App.
2011), "The task of appellate sentence review is neither easy nor well defined." However, as
reaffirmed in Justice, when an appellant contends that an excessively harsh sentence has been
imposed, the appellate court conducts an independent review of the record. 152 Idaho at

266

P .3d at 1158.
Maximiliano asks this Court to conduct that independent review. And, he asks that for
the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief, that this Court find that the sentence imposed is
excessive.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Maximiliano asks this Court to remand the case for an
inquiry into the factual basis of the pleas with directions that if a factual basis is found lacking
that an opportunity be given to withdraw the pleas. He also asks that the remand instructions
include an instruction to reduce the excessive sentence should the pleas ultimately not be
withdrawn. In the alternative, he asks that this Court reduce the excessive sentence.

<I(
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